A curated list of papers ordered by number of citations. Last updated 2020-02-25

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014
1271
2.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol : Analysis and Applications Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos. 2014
738
3.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
435
4.Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions Gentry, Craig and Wichs, Daniel. 2011
299
5.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
249
6.How to use Bitcoin to design fair protocols Bentov, Iddo and Kumaresan, Ranjit. 2014
231
7.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
226
8.Recursive composition and bootstrapping for SNARKs and proof-carrying data Bitansky, Nir and Canetti, Ran and Chiesa, Alessandro and Tromer, Eran. 2013
185
9.Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs Bitansky, Nir and Chiesa, Alessandro and Ishai, Yuval and Paneth, Omer and Ostrovsky, Rafail. 2013
184
10.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
162
11.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
140
12.Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
120
13.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with Chains of Variable Difficulty Juan A. Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos. 2016
98
14.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
98
15.Speed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2015
93
16.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
89
17.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
72
18.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
67
19.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
55
20.Publicly Verifiable Proofs of Sequential Work Mahmoody, Mohammad and Moran, Tal and Vadhan, Salil. 2013
49
21.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
40
22.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
36
23.Scalable Multi-party Computation for zk-SNARK Parameters in the Random Beacon Model Sean Bowe and Ariel Gabizon and Ian Miers. 2017
35
24.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
33
25.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
31
26.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
29
27.Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan. 2014
24
28.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
19
29.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
16
30.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
13
31.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
11
32.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
10
33.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
8
34.Managing Secrets with Consensus Networks: Fairness, Ransomware and Access Control. Kaptchuk, Gabriel and Miers, Ian and Green, Matthew. 2017
7
35.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
7
36.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
5
37.Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks Kr\'ol, Micha\l and Sonnino, Alberto and Al-Bassam, Mustafa and Tasiopoulos, Argyrios G and Psaras, Ioannis. 2019
4
38.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
4
39.Simulation Extractability in Groth’s zk-SNARK Atapoor, Shahla and Baghery, Karim. 2019
3
40.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
3
41.Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek. 2019
2
42.Iterated Search Problems and Blockchain Security under Falsifiable Assumptions Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2019
2
43.A Composable Security Treatment of the Lightning Network Aggelos Kiayias and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. 2019
2
44.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
2
45.Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Punishable Abort Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael. 2018
1
46.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
1
47.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019
1
48.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
1
49.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden. 2019
1
50.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
1
51.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
1
52.Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
0
53.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
0
54.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
55.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
0
56.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
0
57.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
0
58.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
0
59.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
0
60.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
0
61.Single Secret Leader Election Boneh, Dan and Eskandarian, Saba and Hanzlik, Lucjan and Greco, Nicola. 2020
0
62.Lower Bounds for Off-Chain Protocols: Exploring the Limits of Plasma Stefan Dziembowski and Grzegorz Fabiański and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2020
0
63.Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups Lior Rotem and Gil Segev and Ido Shahaf. 2020
0