Papers (86)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014  
1838
2.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol : Analysis and Applications Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos. 2014  
1082
3.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
581
4.Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
403
5.Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions Gentry, Craig and Wichs, Daniel. 2011  
370
6.How to use Bitcoin to design fair protocols Bentov, Iddo and Kumaresan, Ranjit. 2014
318
7.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
315
8.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
293
9.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
258
10.Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs Bitansky, Nir and Chiesa, Alessandro and Ishai, Yuval and Paneth, Omer and Ostrovsky, Rafail. 2013
247
11.Recursive composition and bootstrapping for SNARKs and proof-carrying data Bitansky, Nir and Canetti, Ran and Chiesa, Alessandro and Tromer, Eran. 2013
231
12.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
180
13.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with Chains of Variable Difficulty Juan A. Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos. 2016  
167
14.Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
155
15.Speed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2015
144
16.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
134
17.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
133
18.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
101
19.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
83
20.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
80
21.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
77
22.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
74
23.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
67
24.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
65
25.Publicly Verifiable Proofs of Sequential Work Mahmoody, Mohammad and Moran, Tal and Vadhan, Salil. 2013
65
26.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
51
27.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
41
28.Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan. 2014
30
29.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
30
30.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
25
31.On the (in) security of SNARKs in the presence of oracles Fiore, Dario and Nitulescu, Anca. 2016
21
32.A Composable Security Treatment of the Lightning Network Aggelos Kiayias and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. 2019
19
33.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
19
34.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
17
35.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
16
36.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
16
37.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
16
38.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
15
39.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019   
15
40.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
13
41.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
12
42.Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels Lukas Aumayr and Oguzhan Ersoy and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Kristina Hostakova and Matteo Maffei and Pedro Moreno-Sanchez and Siavash Riahi. 2020
12
43.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
11
44.Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek. 2019
9
45.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
9
46.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
8
47.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020
7
48.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
6
49.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
6
50.Lower Bounds for Off-Chain Protocols: Exploring the Limits of Plasma Stefan Dziembowski and Grzegorz Fabiański and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2020
6
51.Resource-Restricted Cryptography: Revisiting MPC Bounds in the Proof-of-Work Era Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Ostrovsky, Rafail M and Panagiotakos, Giorgos and Zikas, Vassilis. 2020
6
52.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020
6
53.Single Secret Leader Election Boneh, Dan and Eskandarian, Saba and Hanzlik, Lucjan and Greco, Nicola. 2020
5
54.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020  
5
55.Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Punishable Abort Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael. 2018
4
56.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
4
57.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden. 2019
4
58.Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups Lior Rotem and Gil Segev and Ido Shahaf. 2020
4
59.Iterated Search Problems and Blockchain Security under Falsifiable Assumptions Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2019
3
60.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
3
61.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
3
62.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020
3
63.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020
3
64.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019
2
65.Storing and Retrieving Secrets on a Blockchain Vipul Goyal and Abhiram Kothapalli and Elisaweta Masserova and Bryan Parno and Yifan Song. 2020
2
66.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020
2
67.Barriers for Succinct Arguments in the Random Oracle Model Alessandro Chiesa and Eylon Yogev. 2020
2
68.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
1
69.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
1
70.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020
1
71.Information Theoretic HotStuff Abraham, Ittai and Stern, Gilad. 2020
1
72.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020
1
73.Publicly Verifiable Zero Knowledge from (Collapsing) Blockchains Scafuro, Alessandra and Siniscalchi, Luisa and Visconti, Ivan. 2020
1
74.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
1
75.Scalable Multi-party Computation for zk-SNARK Parameters in the Random Beacon Model Sean Bowe and Ariel Gabizon and Ian Miers. 2017
0
76.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
77.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020
0
78.Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa. 2020
0
79.On the (Ir)Replaceability of Global Setups, or How (Not) to Use a Global Ledger Christian Badertscher and Julia Hesse and Vassilis Zikas. 2020
0
80.Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020
0
81.Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020
0
82.NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020
0
83.SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020
0
84.Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021
0
85.A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers Christoph Egger and Mike Graf and Ralf Kuesters and Daniel Rausch and Viktoria Ronge and and Dominique Schröder. 2021
0
86.When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021
0

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