Papers (92)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014
2195
2.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol : Analysis and Applications Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos. 2014
1356
3.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
675
4.Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
477
5.Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions Gentry, Craig and Wichs, Daniel. 2011
417
6.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
384
7.How to use Bitcoin to design fair protocols Bentov, Iddo and Kumaresan, Ranjit. 2014
382
8.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
319
9.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
311
10.Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs Bitansky, Nir and Chiesa, Alessandro and Ishai, Yuval and Paneth, Omer and Ostrovsky, Rafail. 2013
297
11.Recursive composition and bootstrapping for SNARKs and proof-carrying data Bitansky, Nir and Canetti, Ran and Chiesa, Alessandro and Tromer, Eran. 2013
267
12.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with Chains of Variable Difficulty Juan A. Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos. 2016
217
13.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
210
14.Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
181
15.Speed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2015
174
16.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
168
17.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
154
18.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
129
19.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
126
20.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
105
21.Scalable Multi-party Computation for zk-SNARK Parameters in the Random Beacon Model Sean Bowe and Ariel Gabizon and Ian Miers. 2017
98
22.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
94
23.Publicly Verifiable Proofs of Sequential Work Mahmoody, Mohammad and Moran, Tal and Vadhan, Salil. 2013
87
24.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
84
25.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
83
26.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
79
27.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
62
28.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
59
29.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
53
30.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
40
31.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019
38
32.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
37
33.Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan. 2014
33
34.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
33
35.A Composable Security Treatment of the Lightning Network Aggelos Kiayias and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. 2019
30
36.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
28
37.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
27
38.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
26
39.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
24
40.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
24
41.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
23
42.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
23
43.On the (in) security of SNARKs in the presence of oracles Fiore, Dario and Nitulescu, Anca. 2016
22
44.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020
21
45.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
19
46.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020
18
47.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
17
48.Storing and Retrieving Secrets on a Blockchain Vipul Goyal and Abhiram Kothapalli and Elisaweta Masserova and Bryan Parno and Yifan Song. 2020
17
49.Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek. 2019
15
50.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
13
51.Single Secret Leader Election Boneh, Dan and Eskandarian, Saba and Hanzlik, Lucjan and Greco, Nicola. 2020
13
52.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020
12
53.Resource-Restricted Cryptography: Revisiting MPC Bounds in the Proof-of-Work Era Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Ostrovsky, Rafail M and Panagiotakos, Giorgos and Zikas, Vassilis. 2020
12
54.TARDIS: A Foundation of Time-Lock Puzzles in UC Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael and Nielsen12, Jesper Buus and Oechsner, Sabine. 2020
12
55.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
11
56.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020
11
57.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
10
58.Lower Bounds for Off-Chain Protocols: Exploring the Limits of Plasma Stefan Dziembowski and Grzegorz Fabiański and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2020
9
59.Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups Lior Rotem and Gil Segev and Ido Shahaf. 2020
9
60.SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020
9
61.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
7
62.Reducing Participation Costs via Incremental Verification for Ledger Systems Weikeng Chen and Alessandro Chiesa and Emma Dauterman and Nicholas P. Ward. 2020
7
63.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Roughgarden, Tim. 2021
6
64.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
5
65.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden. 2019
5
66.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020
4
67.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020
4
68.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
3
69.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019
3
70.Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa. 2020
3
71.Barriers for Succinct Arguments in the Random Oracle Model Alessandro Chiesa and Eylon Yogev. 2020
3
72.Publicly Verifiable Zero Knowledge from (Collapsing) Blockchains Scafuro, Alessandra and Siniscalchi, Luisa and Visconti, Ivan. 2020
2
73.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
1
74.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020
1
75.Information Theoretic HotStuff Abraham, Ittai and Stern, Gilad. 2020
1
76.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020
1
77.On the (Ir)Replaceability of Global Setups, or How (Not) to Use a Global Ledger Christian Badertscher and Julia Hesse and Vassilis Zikas. 2020
1
78.A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers Christoph Egger and Mike Graf and Ralf Kuesters and Daniel Rausch and Viktoria Ronge and and Dominique Schröder. 2021
1
79.Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Punishable Abort Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael. 2018
0
80.Iterated Search Problems and Blockchain Security under Falsifiable Assumptions Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2019
0
81.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
82.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
0
83.Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels Lukas Aumayr and Oguzhan Ersoy and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Kristina Hostakova and Matteo Maffei and Pedro Moreno-Sanchez and Siavash Riahi. 2020
0
84.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020
0
85.Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020
0
86.Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020
0
87.NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020
0
88.Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021
0
89.When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021
0
90.Semantics and complexity of bitcoin script Reisenegger Butr\'on, Thomas. 2021
0
91.Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain Abraham, Ittai and Dolev, Danny and Eyal, Ittay and Halpern, Joseph Y. 2022
0
92.How much is the fork? Fast Probability and Profitability Calculation during Temporary Forks Judmayer, Aljosha and Stifter, Nicholas and Schindler, Philipp and Weippel, Edgar. 2022
0

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