Papers (90)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014
2110
2.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol : Analysis and Applications Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos. 2014
1285
3.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
666
4.Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
442
5.Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions Gentry, Craig and Wichs, Daniel. 2011
395
6.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
359
7.How to use Bitcoin to design fair protocols Bentov, Iddo and Kumaresan, Ranjit. 2014
349
8.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
308
9.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
287
10.Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs Bitansky, Nir and Chiesa, Alessandro and Ishai, Yuval and Paneth, Omer and Ostrovsky, Rafail. 2013
273
11.Recursive composition and bootstrapping for SNARKs and proof-carrying data Bitansky, Nir and Canetti, Ran and Chiesa, Alessandro and Tromer, Eran. 2013
247
12.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
200
13.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with Chains of Variable Difficulty Juan A. Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos. 2016
196
14.Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014
168
15.Speed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2015
162
16.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
151
17.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
150
18.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
120
19.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
107
20.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
91
21.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
90
22.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
86
23.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
83
24.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
75
25.Publicly Verifiable Proofs of Sequential Work Mahmoody, Mohammad and Moran, Tal and Vadhan, Salil. 2013
73
26.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
57
27.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
55
28.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
42
29.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019
32
30.Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan. 2014
31
31.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
30
32.A Composable Security Treatment of the Lightning Network Aggelos Kiayias and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. 2019
25
33.On the (in) security of SNARKs in the presence of oracles Fiore, Dario and Nitulescu, Anca. 2016
23
34.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
21
35.Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels Lukas Aumayr and Oguzhan Ersoy and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Kristina Hostakova and Matteo Maffei and Pedro Moreno-Sanchez and Siavash Riahi. 2020
21
36.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
20
37.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
20
38.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
20
39.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
19
40.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
18
41.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
16
42.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
16
43.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
16
44.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
16
45.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020
14
46.Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek. 2019
10
47.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
10
48.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020
9
49.Storing and Retrieving Secrets on a Blockchain Vipul Goyal and Abhiram Kothapalli and Elisaweta Masserova and Bryan Parno and Yifan Song. 2020
9
50.Resource-Restricted Cryptography: Revisiting MPC Bounds in the Proof-of-Work Era Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Ostrovsky, Rafail M and Panagiotakos, Giorgos and Zikas, Vassilis. 2020
9
51.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
8
52.Single Secret Leader Election Boneh, Dan and Eskandarian, Saba and Hanzlik, Lucjan and Greco, Nicola. 2020
8
53.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020
8
54.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Roughgarden, Tim. 2021
8
55.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
7
56.Lower Bounds for Off-Chain Protocols: Exploring the Limits of Plasma Stefan Dziembowski and Grzegorz Fabiański and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2020
7
57.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020
7
58.Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups Lior Rotem and Gil Segev and Ido Shahaf. 2020
6
59.TARDIS: A Foundation of Time-Lock Puzzles in UC Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael and Nielsen12, Jesper Buus and Oechsner, Sabine. 2020
6
60.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
5
61.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
5
62.Reducing Participation Costs via Incremental Verification for Ledger Systems Weikeng Chen and Alessandro Chiesa and Emma Dauterman and Nicholas P. Ward. 2020
5
63.The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden. 2019
4
64.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020
4
65.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020
3
66.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
2
67.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019
2
68.Barriers for Succinct Arguments in the Random Oracle Model Alessandro Chiesa and Eylon Yogev. 2020
2
69.Publicly Verifiable Zero Knowledge from (Collapsing) Blockchains Scafuro, Alessandra and Siniscalchi, Luisa and Visconti, Ivan. 2020
2
70.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
1
71.Information Theoretic HotStuff Abraham, Ittai and Stern, Gilad. 2020
1
72.Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa. 2020
1
73.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020
1
74.Scalable Multi-party Computation for zk-SNARK Parameters in the Random Beacon Model Sean Bowe and Ariel Gabizon and Ian Miers. 2017
0
75.Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Punishable Abort Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael. 2018
0
76.Iterated Search Problems and Blockchain Security under Falsifiable Assumptions Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2019
0
77.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
78.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
0
79.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020
0
80.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020
0
81.On the (Ir)Replaceability of Global Setups, or How (Not) to Use a Global Ledger Christian Badertscher and Julia Hesse and Vassilis Zikas. 2020
0
82.Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020
0
83.Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020
0
84.NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020
0
85.SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020
0
86.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
0
87.Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021
0
88.A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers Christoph Egger and Mike Graf and Ralf Kuesters and Daniel Rausch and Viktoria Ronge and and Dominique Schröder. 2021
0
89.When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021
0
90.Semantics and complexity of bitcoin script Reisenegger Butr\'on, Thomas. 2021
0

Videos