game-theory 
Papers (49)
| # | Title | |
| 1. | Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014 | |
| 2. | The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013 | |
| 3. | On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011 | |
| 4. | Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011 | |
| 5. | On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016 | |
| 6. | Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015 | |
| 7. | Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016 | |
| 8. | On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015 | |
| 9. | Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015 | |
| 10. | When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015 | |
| 11. | Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016 | |
| 12. | Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015 | |
| 13. | Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018 | |
| 14. | The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018 | |
| 15. | Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017 | |
| 16. | Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017 | |
| 17. | Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018 | |
| 18. | Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018 | |
| 19. | Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018 | |
| 20. | Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014 | |
| 21. | Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018 | |
| 22. | A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018 | |
| 23. | SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019 | |
| 24. | Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019 | |
| 25. | Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019 | |
| 26. | A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019 | |
| 27. | On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019 | |
| 28. | Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019 | |
| 29. | SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019 | |
| 30. | DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019 | |
| 31. | Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019 | |
| 32. | Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017 | |
| 33. | On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019 | |
| 34. | On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020 | |
| 35. | Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020 | |
| 36. | Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers Angeris, Guillermo and Chitra, Tarun. 2020 | |
| 37. | BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019 | |
| 38. | Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020 | |
| 39. | Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020 | |
| 40. | Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019 | |
| 41. | Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019 | |
| 42. | Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019 | |
| 43. | Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019 | |
| 44. | Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019 | |
| 45. | TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019 | |
| 46. | Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020 | |
| 47. | Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020 | |
| 48. | MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020 | |
| 49. | Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020 |
Videos
–
Links
–