Papers (50)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014  
1652
2.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
529
3.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
293
4.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
284
5.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
228
6.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
164
7.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
126
8.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
121
9.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
92
10.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
75
11.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
67
12.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
67
13.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
62
14.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
57
15.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
53
16.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
47
17.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
33
18.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
22
19.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
21
20.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
18
21.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
13
22.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
13
23.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
12
24.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
9
25.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
9
26.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
8
27.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019   
8
28.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
8
29.SquirRL: Automating attack discovery on blockchain incentive mechanisms with deep reinforcement learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
8
30.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
7
31.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
7
32.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
6
33.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
4
34.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
4
35.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020
4
36.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020
3
37.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
2
38.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
2
39.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
2
40.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020
2
41.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019
2
42.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020  
2
43.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
1
44.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
1
45.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020
1
46.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
0
47.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
48.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020
0
49.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020
0
50.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020
0

Videos

–