Papers (game-theory) [35]
A curated list of papers ordered by number of citations. Last updated 2019-12-10
# | Title | |
1. | Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014 ![]() | |
2. | The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013 | |
3. | On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011 | |
4. | Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011 | |
5. | On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016 | |
6. | Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015 | |
7. | On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015 | |
8. | Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016 | |
9. | Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015 | |
10. | When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015 | |
11. | Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016 | |
12. | Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015 | |
13. | Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017 | |
14. | Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017 | |
15. | The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018 | |
16. | Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018 | |
17. | Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014 | |
18. | Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018 | |
19. | Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018 | |
20. | Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018 | |
21. | Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018 | |
22. | A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018 | |
23. | SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019 | |
24. | Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017 | |
25. | Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks Kr\'ol, Micha\l and Sonnino, Alberto and Al-Bassam, Mustafa and Tasiopoulos, Argyrios G and Psaras, Ioannis. 2019 | |
26. | Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019 | |
27. | On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019 | |
28. | Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019 | |
29. | Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019 | |
30. | DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019 | |
31. | Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019 | |
32. | TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019 | |
33. | Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019 | |
34. | Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019 | |
35. | SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019 |