Papers (56)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014  
1788
2.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013
565
3.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011
310
4.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011
291
5.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016
251
6.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015
174
7.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015
131
8.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016
130
9.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015
97
10.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018
79
11.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015
78
12.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015
73
13.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016
71
14.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018
62
15.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017
59
16.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017
51
17.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018
25
18.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018
22
19.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014
18
20.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019
16
21.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019
16
22.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018
15
23.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019
14
24.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019   
13
25.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018
12
26.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019
12
27.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019
10
28.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019
10
29.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019
8
30.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019
7
31.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019
6
32.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020
6
33.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020
6
34.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019
5
35.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017
4
36.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020  
4
37.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019
3
38.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020
3
39.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020
2
40.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019
2
41.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019
1
42.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019
1
43.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020
1
44.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020
1
45.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020
1
46.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020
1
47.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019
1
48.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018
0
49.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019
0
50.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020
0
51.Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020
0
52.Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020
0
53.NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020
0
54.SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020
0
55.Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021
0
56.When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021
0

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